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Abstract
We examine whether opportunities for civic engagement mediate the effect of access to ed-
ucation on political violence. In fragile states, solely providing education may be necessary,
but not sufficient, to reduce violence. Access to schooling can generate unintended grievances
against the government. We argue that combining access to education with opportunities for
civic participation helps youths to use nonviolent channels to engage with their communities
and address their grievances, reducing the risk of conflict. To test our argument of the in-
teractive effect of education and civic participation, we leverage a unique education program
implemented in partnership with the Federal Government of Somalia. Using original data
from a survey of 800 young people, as well as qualitative interviews, we find support for our
argument. This article provides new empirical evidence of the role of civic engagement in
promoting political stability in fragile states.
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Government investment in education is widely believed to promote peace in fragile states
(Assembly, 1948; Collier et al., 2003; Winthrop and Matsui, 2013).1 At the same time, increasing
access to education can initiate unintended grievances that increase the risk of conflict (Huntington,
1968; Choucri, 1974; Goldstone, 2001; Urdal, 2006; Lia, 2007). Surprisingly, there is a dearth of
evidence on the conditions under which education can motivate aggrieved individuals to prefer to
use nonviolent channels for political action. We investigate one such condition: gaining skills and
opportunities for civic engagement. Civic engagement can heighten a sense of working with others
to build one’s community and allow individuals to raise concerns with local leaders and national
authorities through non-political and political processes (Ehrlich, 2000; Jacoby and Associates,
2009). When combined with education, we propose that civic engagement can reduce violence.
There are multiple mechanisms through which increased education can reduce the threat of
violence. The provision of education can boost citizens’ perceptions of their government’s legiti-
macy and responsiveness (Aoki et al., 2002), promote economic development and social equality
(Thyne, 2006; Winthrop and Matsui, 2013), and, consequently, reduce grievances (Ted, 1970; Ced-
erman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). Education can also increase optimism for future employment
and increase an individual’s cost of participating in violent collective action (Collier and Hoeffler,
2004; Barakat and Urdal, 2009). Furthermore, schools can provide opportunities to build new ties
and communities, generating a sense of belonging and reducing the allure to join violent groups
(Borum, 2014).2
However, in the absence of opportunities to use nonviolent channels to build their society
and express their frustrations, aggrieved youth may turn to violence (Walter, 2004; Aksoy and
Carter, 2014). Greater awareness of the educational standards and economic opportunities in more
1In 2011, one-third of the world’s 60 million out-of-school adolescents of lower secondary
school age lived in fragile states (UNESCO, 2013).
2Some scholars have also emphasized the content of education as an important mediating factor.
Our focus is on access to schooling.
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advanced societies through schooling can lead youths to perceive government provision of educa-
tion as inadequate. Youths may also come to expect jobs, and governments may struggle to meet
these expectations in the short run (Urdal, 2006). Moreover, the argument that those with access
to education may prefer nonviolent approaches to addressing their grievances (Huntington, 1968;
Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Hegre, 2003) assumes that such channels exist and that individuals can
use them.
Building post-conflict states and economies takes time and substantial resources. We argue
that while fragile states may not be able to immediately satisfy citizens’ demands for high-quality
education and jobs, complementing access to schooling with opportunities for civic engagement
will help individuals to build the necessary skills to use nonviolent channels to raise their concerns
with their local authorities to affect change. Such opportunities can increase an individual’s sense
of agency and trust in the efficacy of nonviolent methods of addressing their grievances, reducing
the risk of violence.
We test our argument in Somaliland—an autonomous region in the fragile state of So-
malia. Our study leverages a unique education program implemented under the auspices of the
Government of Somalia.3 The program was aimed at improving access to secondary education
and promoting civic engagement across the three regions of Somalia (Somaliland, Puntland and
South Central Somalia).4 The government rolled out the provision of secondary schools to all
target communities, but gradually added a civic engagement component in Somaliland. The stag-
gered implementation of the civic engagement component of the program produced two types of
localities where the youths either had: 1) access to secondary schools only; or 2) access to sec-
3The program was implemented by Mercy Corps, a global humanitarian agency working in
fragile states experiencing natural disasters, economic collapse or conflict. It was was funded by
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
4We evaluate the impact of the program in one region, Somaliland, because the program had
not been rolled out in the other two regions at the time of our study.
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ondary schools as well as opportunities for civic engagement. In each of these settings, young
people decided whether or not to sign up for the program.
The empirical analysis relies on original survey data collected from 802 young people
in the sampled communities. We used survey methods robust to soliciting truthful answers to
measure respondents’ attitudes regarding support for or involvement in violence to reduce social
desirability bias (Blair, Imai and Zhou, 2015). We address potential selection bias by employing
statistical matching techniques to create comparable groups of individuals who, on average, only
differ in their participation given their observable characteristics.
The results support our argument that opportunities for civic engagement conditions the
effect of education on violence. Specifically, we find that compared to out-of-school youths, in-
school individuals in communities that benefited from both access to education and civic engage-
ment programs were less likely to participate (14 percentage points decrease) and less likely to
support violence (16 percentage points decrease). These effects are substantively large and robust
to a variety of theoretically important control variables. In contrast, while in-school youths in com-
munities that only had access to schools were less likely to participate in violence (15 percentage
points decrease), they were more likely to express support for political violence (11 percentage
points increase) compared to their out-of-school counterparts. Using quantitative and qualitative
data, we also find significant evidence to support our proposed mechanism. Specifically, oppor-
tunities for civic engagement generate a sense of agency and belief in the efficacy of nonviolent
ways to address grievances.
In addition to contributing original empirical evidence to the literature on whether and how
education influences individuals’ propensities to pick up arms, we break new grounds in consider-
ing the conditions under which schooling may reduce political violence in fragile states. Specif-
ically, our study goes beyond the current literature regarding the impact of schooling on political
violence that focuses on the level, expansion, inequality and content of education (see Østby and
Urdal, 2011) to analyze how access to education may interact with skills to civically engage at the
3
individual level. In this regard, our study uniquely combines seemingly disjoint strands of literature
on political violence, education and civic or political institutions, and thus contributes to the grow-
ing empirical work on the effect of political institutions on conflict (Hegre, 2003; Windsor, 2003;
Aksoy and Carter, 2014; Piazza, 2015). Also, current research on civic engagement or associa-
tional life focuses on its potential impact on government performance and economic development
(Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1994; Boix and Posner, 1996; Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik, 2005).
Our study highlights the role of civic engagement or cultivating associational life in peace-building
efforts in post-conflict societies.
1 Theoretical expectations
1.1 Access to higher education and participation in violence
Scholars argue that access to higher education provides opportunities for economic and
social advancement for youth, which reduces their willingness to participate in violence (Becker,
1968; Hamermesh and Soss, 1974).5 The prospects of gainful employment that access to higher ed-
ucation provides can discourage young people from supporting or engaging in political violence.6
5The United Nations Development Program emphasizes income and education as two important
measures of deprivation.
6We note here, however, that empirical support for the relationship between poverty, unem-
ployment and violence is scant and often contrary to the stated expectation (Krueger and Laitin,
2008). For example, studies conducted by Mercy Corps based on opinion-poll data in Afghanistan
and Somalia found no link between employment and propensity towards political violence while
research in Pakistan found that individuals from middle-income households were more likely than
those from low-income households to support violent insurgent groups (Blair et al., 2013). Also, at
the cross-national level, while economic factors such as poverty (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), and
unemployment (Sageman, 2004) have been linked to the onset of terrorism and violence within
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Thus, the lack of incentive for the highly educated to rebel against the state may be explained by
what they stand to lose in a destabilized society or economy. Researchers have found that local vio-
lent extremist movements often appeal to vulnerable youth who lack opportunities for educational
and livelihood advancement. For example, Onuoha (2014) suggests that most recruits who joined
Boko Haram—a group more similar to Al Shabaab than transnational terrorist organizations—
were either unskilled or uneducated. Similarly, Lyall, Blair and Imai (2013) find that support for
the Taliban in Afghanistan declines with years of government education.
Young people are also more likely to perceive governments that can provide access to ed-
ucation as legitimate, which reduces their propensity to support or participate in violence against
public officials. Research shows that a government’s ability to provide education and other public
services improves perceptions of its legitimacy (Richards, 2002; Grynkewich, 2008; Magouirk,
2008). At the same time, the ability of states to provide these services makes it harder for insur-
gent terrorist groups to emerge (Newman, 2007; Grynkewich, 2008). For example, scholars have
found a strong relationship between a lack of infrastructure (including schools) in communities in
the Niger Delta and an individual’s willingness to participate in violent rebellion, suggesting that
people in areas with, presumably, more government services, are less likely to engage in violent
insurgency (Oyefusi, 2008). If the absence of government services creates a physical void and
deficit of state legitimacy through which violent groups can gain traction by providing for com-
munity needs (Magouirk, 2008), then inversely, the existence of reliable and satisfactory govern-
ment services—including the provision of education—may create a buffer from violent extremist
groups. Accordingly, access to education should boost perceptions of legitimacy of governments
among youth.
Another pathway connecting access to education and violence is generating a sense of
group belonging among youth. Specifically, some scholars have argued that the need for commu-
countries, these effects tend to disappear when taking into account country-specific characteristics
such as levels of political freedom (Abadie, 2004).
5
nity and group membership catalyzes youths who feel social exclusion and isolation to join violent
groups. First, empirical research shows that individuals tend to join violent organizations if they
have kin or peer connections to members of such groups (Sageman, 2004; Bakker, 2006). Sec-
ond, for some youth, joining a violent extremist group provides them with a sense of belonging,
connectedness and affiliation (Borum, 2014). This is particularly true for youth who lack a sense
of social acceptance and group affiliation, which occurs mostly among young people who are so-
cially isolated and marginalized, such as Muslim immigrants in Western countries (see Allan et al.,
2015). To the extent that being in school reduces isolation by allowing students to form positive
social bonds with peers, teachers and others in their community or by giving them social standing
and acceptance, access to education may undermine the recruitment and participation of youth in
violence.
In light of the above, we expect that access to higher education should decrease an individ-
ual’s support for or participation in violence (H1). To the extent that education generates a sense
of future economic prospects, increases perceptions of government’s legitimacy and responsive-
ness, and increases a sense of belonging among youth, we expect that access to higher education
would reduce support for or participation in violence.
However, the education-as-opportunity theory may also engender negative implications for
vulnerability to violent extremism. If youths increase their expectations of career opportunities
but such beliefs are not met, they risk disillusionment, which could be a push factor for support-
ing or participation in violent extremism. That education could lead to an increase in support or
involvement in violence is similar to how Angrist (1995) describes the deterioration of economic
opportunities for highly educated youth leading to the outbreak of civil unrest in Palestine in the
late 1980s. This argument builds on evidence that decisions to support or engage in violent ex-
tremism are driven less by objective condition than by perceptions and expectations that are based
on individual psychology. For instance, Fair et al. (2013) demonstrate that inducing perceptions
of relative poverty can induce support for insurgency. It is the perception of injustice induced by
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relative deprivation more than the objective conditions of want that can fuel violence. Accord-
ingly, if access to education raises awareness of injustices and creates a gap between expectations
and reality, it may increase (rather than decrease) an individual’s propensity to engage in violence
against the state.
1.2 Access to education and civic engagement, and participation in violence
That access to higher education in itself may exacerbate an individual’s grievances, and,
in turn, increase their support or participation in violence suggests that scholars and policymak-
ers should consider in what circumstances when the provision of learning opportunities would
decrease youths involvement in violence. Our review of the literature above suggests that govern-
ments may have to augment the provision of higher education with, for example, real economic
opportunities to meet the expectations of the youth. However, in post-conflict settings, the recon-
struction of societies and economies can be challenging and lengthy. Accordingly, scholars need to
consider what effective intermediate interventions can augment social and economic empowerment
programs. We argue that providing youths with nonviolent channels to participate productively in
their society and build the skills to raise their concerns to local authorities and contribute to policy
decision may mitigate their tendencies to support or use violence to address potential political and
economic grievances that higher learning can generate. Our reasons are twofold.
First, we argue that the ability to engage civically cultivates an individual’s sense of agency
or empowerment in building their communities and working peacefully with authorities to bring
change, decreasing their propensity to resort to violence. When individuals feel alienated from
the political processes and believe that they cannot influence government decisions, they are more
likely to use violence to express their frustration. However, opportunities to engage in civic life can
help individuals develop democratic attitudes such as a sense of mutual trust, reciprocity and shared
responsibility (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1994; Jacoby and Associates, 2009). Furthermore,
citizens who engage in associational life experience things such as tolerance, compromise and sol-
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idarity, all of which are deemed to be prerequisites for peaceful political expression. Indeed, based
on this logic, many interventions aimed at countering violent extremism are designed to foster civic
participation. Some empirical research lends support to these approaches by demonstrating that a
correlation between the repression of nonviolent means of participation and increased terrorism
(Piazza, 2015), bolstering the notion that civic engagement and participation in civil society are
effective ways to counter violent extremism (Kaldor, 2008).
Relatedly, a second mechanism through which civic engagement can reduce support and
participation in violence is generating a belief among youths that they can change things through
nonviolent actions. The logic is that, through civic engagement activities, individuals internalize
civic and political beliefs that underlie nonviolent behaviors. Some empirical research corrobo-
rates this claim. Mercy Corps’ study among youths in Kenya demonstrates that youth who were
civically engaged and took action to try to address local or national governance problems were
less likely to engage in or support political violence (Krutz, 2011). The study concludes that when
youth have more avenues to express themselves peacefully and believe they can make a difference
through nonviolent actions, they are less likely to be drawn to political violence, including violent
extremism.
In sum, we hypothesize that access to education and opportunities for civic engagement
would reduce support for or participation in violence (H2). While education can induce unin-
tended discontent in society, opportunities for civic engagement can develop an individual’s sense
of agency and appreciation of the efficacy of nonviolent channels to expressing grievance and shap-
ing their future. To the extent that opportunities for civic engagement fosters a sense of agency and
a belief in the efficacy of civic engagement, we expect it to reduce individual support and partici-
pation in violence.
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2 Setting: Somaliland
We test our theory in Somaliland, an autonomous region of Somalia in the Horn of Africa.
Freedom House ranks Somaliland’s government as partly democratic.7 Since 2003, the region has
held three competitive and democratic presidential elections with one leading to a peaceful transi-
tion of power in 2010.8 Somaliland is an ideal setting for our study on effective responses to vio-
lent extremism for a number of reasons. While Somaliland declared independence from Somalia
in 1991 following the overthrow of Somali military dictator Siad Barre and has remained relatively
stable compared to the other regions of Somalia, a number of factors make the region’s youth
vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups such as Al Shabaab. Somaliland remains
unrecognized by the international community, which dampens the region’s ability to progress eco-
nomically. While the region has fairly functional government institutions, youth who constitute
about 75 percent of the country’s 3.5 million population (2017 estimate) have limited access to
education, are largely poor and lack employment opportunities.9 In 2015, the World Bank reported
that more than half of the population have no access to formal education and the level of poverty in
rural and urban areas in Somaliland was 37 and 30 percent, respectively. At the same time, only 26
percent and 32.7 percent of 15 to 55 year olds in rural and urban Somaliland were wage- or self-
employed.10
7The region of Somaliland shares borders with Djibouti to the west, Ethiopia to the south,
Somalia to the east and the Gulf of Aden to the north.
8Somaliland’s 2001 Constitution provides for a separation of powers between the executive, the
legislature and the judiciary. The president is elected using plurality rule and can serve a maximum
of two five-year terms. (See http://africanelections.tripod.com/somaliland.
html)
9BBC Somaliland Profile, accessed April 16, 2017.
10World Bank’s “Somaliland: Poverty Assessment,” June 2015.
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As part of the geographic reach of Somalia, conflict and instability have plagued the region
for the past three decades. Lawlessness and the disintegration of the Somali state have made it
possible for violent extremist groups, like Al Shabaab (formally known as “Harakat al-Shabaab
al-Mujahideen,” which translates to the “Young Jihadi Movement”) to emerge and take control of
large parts of the country. Al Shabaab recruits from Somaliland have been implicated in recent
attacks, including the Daallo Airline and African Union base attacks in 2016.11 In response, the
government has arrested suspected Al Shabaab cell members in Somaliland and has cracked down
on radical clerics who promote the use of violence, concerned that disgruntled youth may heed
these calls to take up arms.12 In addition to the threat of extremist violence, clan-based grievances
over resources and governance have at times been exploited by clan leaders to foment violence,
presenting another threat to stability.
Policymakers have suggested several approaches—ranging from military actions to eco-
nomic, social and institutional responses—to deal with the threat of violent extremism in Soma-
liland and Somalia more generally (see UNDP, 2015). What is often missing, however, is an
understanding of the drivers of and antidotes to violence, particularly for Somali youth.
In 2016, as part of a broad effort to counter and prevent violent extremism, the Government
of Somalia noted the importance of reducing the incentives of youth to join extremist organizations.
Specifically, the Government of Somalia has invested in opportunities to help youth gain the skills
they need to become positive and productive citizens with an underlying objective of also counter-
11See, Ismail Akwei, “Al-Shabaab Says Former Somali MP Was Suicide Bomber in Tuesday’s
Attack,” All Africa News, July 27, 2016. Also, see, Morgan Winsor, “Somalia Daallo Airlines Ex-
plosion: Suspected Suicide Bomber Meant to Be on Turkish Airlines Flight,” International Busi-
ness Tribune, February 8, 2016.
12See “Somaliland Police Arrest Cleric for Inciting Violence,” Hiiraan Online, May 4, 2016,
and “Somaliland Captures Al-Shabaab Suspects Sneaking into Haregeisa,” Somali Update, July
12, 2015.
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ing violent extremism. Chief among these investments has been formal education. For example,
the Government of Somalia’s new National Strategy and Action Plan for Countering and Prevent-
ing Violent Extremism states that “education is an essential part of preventing violent extremism”
and calls for more educational programs to help youth resist radicalization.13 Moreover, in recent
years, the Government of Somalia, with support from international donors, has undertaken an am-
bitious program to increase access to secondary education for youth through programs such as the
Somali Youth Leaders Initiative (SYLI). Unfortunately, empirical evidence on what policies and
programs work to address these drivers remains sparse. Our study contributes to filling the research
gap.
3 Research design
We leveraged a youth-focused peace and stability program implemented by Mercy Corps in
close collaboration with the Somaliland regional government to examine the impact of education
and civic engagement on violence. The program that we studied provides a unique avenue to
examine not only the effects of providing secondary education but also whether incorporating
civic engagement activities further reduces the propensity for young people to engage in violence.
In this section, we describe the intervention and detail our research strategy.
3.1 Interventions: secondary education and civic engagement
The SYLI was rolled out in 2011 as part of USAID’s broad strategy to promote stability
in Somalia. SYLI targets young people between ages 15 and 24 years in Somaliland, Puntland
and South Central Somalia. The twin objective of the program is to provide quality secondary
education to Somali youth, hoping to benefit more than 150,000 young people directly, and to
13“National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism,” Fed-
eral Republic of Somalia, 27 June 2016, 12.
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provide opportunities for civic engagement for enrolled students. Accordingly, the program has
two components. The first, which we refer to as secondary education, aims to increase access
to secondary education. The second, which we refer to as education and civic engagement, in
addition to education provides opportunities for enrolled youths to engage in civic activities.
The secondary education arm was provided in all of the project communities in Soma-
liland. At the time of the survey, the second component had only been implemented in a handful
of education units.14 We leveraged the staggered implementation of the second component to in-
vestigate the effect of education only and education plus civic engagement. Note that because the
civic engagement component was designed to complement the secondary schooling of youths, we
are unable to examine its independent effects on violence. The details of the interventions are as
follows:
• Secondary education: In Somaliland, the program constructed or rehabilitated 22 schools,
which enrolled about 11,370 youth as of June 2016.15 To improve the quality of education
that these schools provide, SYLI also provided training to teachers on curriculum develop-
ment and pedagogical skills and supported teachers in the obtainment of a two-year teaching
diploma. The program also equipped these schools with teaching and learning materials,
desks and other necessary supplies and equipment. By the government’s policy, access to
these schools is open to all eligible youth within these communities. Nevertheless, attending
these schools is voluntary.
• Education and civic engagement: This component of the program focuses on helping youth
in schools to be leaders in their community through skills building and organizing commu-
14Mercy Corps’ plan was that by the end of the program, all of the schools would have civic
engagement activities.
15The SYLI program plans to construct or rehabilitate 60 secondary schools in Somaliland,
Puntland and South Central Somalia.
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nity action campaigns. The program first identified groups of youth leaders in each of the
treated schools to serve as peer trainers and mobilizers. SYLI trained these youth leaders
in the areas of conflict analysis, peace building, team building and leadership. Applying
these skills, they mobilized their peers to plan together and carry out student-led community
action projects. These activities included, for example: 1) constructing small gardens, clean-
ing compounds and planting trees to beautify school areas; 2) organizing over 200 people
during International Peace Day to discuss issues affecting youth, peace and importance of
civic responsibility; and 3) sensitization campaign in communities to discourage risky, il-
legal migration. Local officials attended some of these events to help and discuss relevant
issues with the youth. The projects were aimed to highlight the value of civic participation
and civic responsibility, and model the principles of good governance and peaceful action.
These exercises exposed students in these schools to first-hand experiences on how to iden-
tify, plan and execute projects working with the wider community for a social impact.
3.2 Sample
To assess the impact of the two interventions, we selected seven out of the 22 schools. Of
these seven schools, three had implemented the civic engagement component. These schools were
selected to allow for a mix of respondents (in and out of schools) living within these communities
who in principal have the opportunity to enroll in the schools to access either secondary education
or education and civic engagement. We also selected these schools to get a mix of students located
in rural and urban areas. Given the preponderance of work in urban areas in Somaliland, five
schools in urban areas and two in the countryside were selected to provide a representative view of
the participants in Somaliland.
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Once we identified these schools, we randomly selected students within these schools and
out-of-school youth located in the same communities, to serve as comparison groups.16 In total,
we surveyed 802 respondents in the target group, including 513 in-school youth and 289 out-of-
school youth. Among those enrolled in schools, 265 had access to only the secondary education
treatment while 248 were in schools that also implemented civic engagement activities. Table
1 shows the distribution of respondents across the different conditions in the full sample, across
regions and location (rural and urban places). None of the schools that implemented the civic
engagement program are located in a rural area, which limits the generalizability of our findings
on civic engagement to city dwellers.
Table 1: Number of respondents across interventions by region and by location
Region Location
Condition Full sample Burao Hargeisa Sanaag Rural Urban
Out of school (control) 289 65 143 81 81 208
Education only 265 0 150 115 114 151
Education and civic engagement 248 167 81 0 0 248
3.3 Data
Our focus was to examine the impact of these interventions on the attitudes of Somali youth
towards violence. We employed survey-based outcomes to measure the propensity of young peo-
ple to support or participate in violence. Given the sensitive nature of the questions, which touched
on issues of individuals’ support and participation in political violence, social desirability bias pre-
sented a concern. To avoid this problem, we employed a random response technique, to evaluate
attitudes in an indirect way (Blair, Imai and Zhou, 2015). This approach asks respondents to use a
randomized device (in our case, a spinner) whose outcome is unobserved by our enumerators. By
16In each school, a number of students were randomly selected from each class to form part of
the sample. Outside of the schools, we randomly selected youth in the vicinity.
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introducing random noise, the method concealed individual responses and thus protected respon-
dent privacy, increasing the chance that individuals report their true beliefs or actions on sensitive
issues. Specifically, we employed a forced-response design that uses a randomization device to
direct respondents to either automatically answer “yes” or “no,” or respond sincerely to the sensi-
tive questions. The approach provides plausible deniability to respondents because a “yes” or “no”
may be a truthful answer or it may indicate that the respondent rolled a forced response. Because
the probability of spinning a forced “yes” or “no” is known by us ex ante (here, 1/6), we can re-
cover the actual proportion of the population that hold a particular view. In spite of the sensitivity
of these attitudes, we nonetheless also asked direct questions to compare our estimates.
For our indirect questions (random response questions), we asked our respondents to pro-
vide answers to the following:
1. In the past 12 months have you had a violent dispute with another person?
2. Do you support the use of violence for a political cause?
As we described above, for these questions, we asked respondents to spin a spinner. If the
handle landed on “answer yes” or “answer no,” they were supposed to answer “yes” or “no,” re-
spectively, irrespective of their true answers. If the handle fell on “answer truthfully,” respondents
were to provide their true answers. To ensure that respondents understood the rules, we provided
an initial mock question and later asked whether they understood the question. Also, about 87
percent of our respondents said they believed that the method helped to hide their true answers.
For our direct questions, we asked our respondents the following:
3. Which of the following is closest to your view? Statement 1: The use of violence is never
justified in politics today. Statement 2: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use
violence in support of a just cause.
4. Have you used force or violence for a political cause?
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To examine the possible mechanisms that may explain the effect of secondary education,
and education and civic engagement on attitudes on violence, we also collected survey-based out-
comes on respondents’ assessments of government responsiveness, employment prospects and
their perception of their personal role in society.17
Finally, since we did not have background characteristics of individuals ahead of our sur-
vey, we also collected these data during the interviews. Specifically, we collected information on
age, gender, marital status, indicators of poverty, the number of children, type of housing and ex-
perience with violent attacks. We also asked respondents whether they belonged to any social or
political groups and about their interest in politics. Because we did not randomize individuals’ par-
ticipation in the two interventions (i.e. secondary education, and education and civic engagement),
we employed these background variables to help us create comparable groups (i.e., treatment and
control) of individuals who are similar, on average, on all these dimensions except for their access
to the programs, which have been suggested in the literature to possibly influence participation in
violence (see Allan et al., 2015). Specifically, we employed a quasi-experimental design (match-
ing) to help estimate possible causal effects of these programs among participants (see section
4.1).
4 Analysis
To understand the impact of SYLI’s interventions on violence, we compared average out-
comes of our dependent variables (DVs) for young people who were enrolled in schools (re)constructed
under the different treatment conditions. Table 2 shows the summary statistics of our DVs. Column
(1) shows the mean and standard errors of the DVs in the full sample while columns (2), (3), and
(4) disaggregate the outcome for respondents out of school (control) who received secondary edu-
17We examine and discuss results of these measures in section 5.
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cation only, and those who received the education and civic engagement treatments, respectively.
Panels A and B of Table 2 groups our DVs under indirect and direct questions, respectively.
Table 2: Summary statistics of dependent variables
Intervention
Variable Full sample Control Education Education and civic engagement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Indirect questions
Had violent dispute (in past twelve months) 0.393 0.456 0.401 0.312
(0.026) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046)
Support use of violence for political cause 0.113 0.181 0.135 0.010
(0.023) (0.040) (0.040) (0.036)
Panel B: Direct questions
Sometimes force is necessary for just cause 0.312 0.322 0.351 0.258
(0.016) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Used force or violence in the past for political cause 0.175 0.254 0.175 0.086
(0.014) (0.026) (0.023) (0.018)
N 802 289 265 248
In the full sample, we find that about 39 percent of the respondents reported that they
have had a violent dispute with another person in the past twelve months. A little over one-tenth
stated that they support the use of violence for a political cause. About a third (31 percent) of
all respondents stated that it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support for a just cause
in Somalia, while 17.5 percent say they have used force or violence for a political cause. These
results suggest a high prevalence of support for and participation in violence among Somali youth.
However, when we disaggregate these estimates by our treatment conditions, we find that such
prevalence in the support and participation in violence is highest amongst young people who are
out of school (column (2)) compared to those who received only secondary education (column(3))
or received education and civic engagement (column (4)). The exception is agreement with the
statement that “force is sometimes necessary for a just cause,” for which we found a slight increase
(about three percent) among those who only received secondary education compared to those out
of school. However, this drops drastically from 32.2 percent in the control to 25.8 percent among
those also receiving the education and civic engagement treatment.
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While these preliminary estimates indicate that these interventions, on average, reduce the
support for and participation in violence and thus provide support for our primary hypotheses,
they mask an important difference across these treatment groups that may mislead any causal
interpretation of these differences. As we mentioned above, participation in these programs was
voluntary. Accordingly, the differences we find may be explained by factors that induce school
attendance in the first place. Indeed, people who choose to attend school and take part in nonviolent
civic activities may also be less inclined to use violence in the first place (i.e., selection bias). In
the next section, we employ a quasi-experimental technique to account for such possibilities.
4.1 Are the effects of secondary education, and education and civic engagement causal?
To mitigate concerns of selection bias in analyzing the effect of these interventions on
propensities to engage in violence, we employ matching on observable characteristics of our re-
spondents. Specifically, we created treatment and control groups that are similar, on average,
based on their stabilized Inverse Probability of Treatment Weights (s-IPTW) of treatment (Hernán,
Hernández-Díaz and Robins, 2004; Cole and Hernán, 2008).18 The s-IPTW for respondent i is
her numerical score generated from her probability of being treated (similar to propensity scores)
based on their observed covariates. For each of our analysis, we generated these estimates through
pairwise comparison between the control units and each of the two treatment conditions.19 Our use
of s-IPTW allows us to mimic a randomized control trial. That is, it allows us to generate treated
and control units that have similar probabilities of treatment conditional on our measured covari-
ates. While we have endeavored to use available theoretically important variables in constructing
our weights, because we cannot be sure we have all relevant covariates, we note that our estimates
18Our use of s-IPTW helps to increase statistical efficiency and attain better coverage of confi-
dence intervals.
19Specifically, we generated two different datasets for our analyses: one for secondary education
and another for education and civic engagement.
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remain susceptible to unobserved confounders.20 Using these weights in Ordinary Least Squares
OLS regressions, we estimate the difference in means between treatment and control groups. The
difference-in-means estimates provide the average causal effect of the interventions on those who
participation (i.e., average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)).
Tables 3 and 4 report our results for our indirect and direct questions, respectively. In
both tables, columns (1)-(4) report the effects of secondary education on our DVs and columns
(5)-(8) reports that for education and civic engagement. For each dependent variable, we present
two models. The first model reports the effect of the treatment on our outcomes of interest with
no covariate adjustments, while the second include as controls the variables used to generate the
probability of treatment weights for each unit to improve the precision of our estimates and account
for imbalance between treatment and control groups. To simplify, we use the adjusted estimates in
our discussion of the results.
To examine our first hypothesis that higher education reduces support for or participation in
violence, we report the impact of secondary education on attitudes and behaviors related to political
violence using our direct and indirect (random response) questions. Our analysis produced mixed
results across these outcomes. When examining direct violence questions, we find that secondary
education decreased the likelihood of youth reporting participation in political violence by 15.8
percentage points while it had no impact on support for political violence (Table 4, columns (1)
-(4)). The indirect (random response) questions, however, suggest that youth’s access to secondary
education increased their support for the use of violence for a political cause by about 11 percentage
points while having no statistically significant impact on having used violence against another
person for reasons that might have been political, tribal or other (Table 3, columns (1)-(4)).21 In
section 5, we draw on our theories of possible mechanisms and empirical evidence to explain this
20See Appendix B for details on our calculation of s-IPTW.
21The latter finding is consistent with what Rebecca Wolfe and Jon Kurtz found in Somali in
2013 that youth who were in schools were more likely to express support for the use of political
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seemingly counterintuitive finding that secondary education increases support for violence but may
reduce the willingness of youth to participate in it.
Turning to our analysis on adding civic engagement activities to access to secondary edu-
cation, we find that such an intervention reduces both the support for and willingness to participate
in political violence. Specifically, the combination of access to secondary education and these
student-led community action projects decreased the probability of agreeing with the statement
that political violence is “sometimes necessary” by 20 percentage points, and reduced the chances
that a youth reported participating in political violence by about 14 percentage points (Table 4
columns (6) and (8), respectively). The indirect survey questions validate this positive impact on
stability outcomes as reported in column (8) of Table 3. Specifically, the combined interventions
decreased the likelihood of youth supporting political violence by 16 percentage points. While we
do not find that education and civic engagement reduce participation in past violent dispute (statis-
tically and substantively), the sign on the estimate is in the hypothesized direction and consistent
with results of our other indicators. These findings, thus, support our hypothesis that access to
education and civic engagement reduce support and participation in violence (H2).
violence (see, “Examining the Links Between Youth Economic Opportunity, Civic Engagement,
and Conflict,” January 2013).
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Table 3: Relationship between secondary education and civic engagement, and violence (indirect questions)
Dependent variable
Had violent dispute Support political violence Had violent dispute Support political violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Secondary education 0.062 0.025 0.102∗∗ 0.108∗∗
(0.054) (0.063) (0.047) (0.054)
Secondary education and civic engagement −0.001 −0.004 −0.146∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.044) (0.044)
Constant 0.426∗∗∗ 0.422 0.214∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.045 0.283∗∗∗ −0.879∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.357) (0.031) (0.308) (0.043) (0.374) (0.034) (0.293)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 346 346 346 346 322 322 322 322
R2 0.004 0.097 0.013 0.137 0.00000 0.166 0.033 0.205
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.050 0.011 0.092 −0.003 0.123 0.030 0.163
Note: For each dependent variable, the table shows the simple difference in weighted means and then includes the set of covariates (including
regional fixed effects) in the next column. Significance level indicated by ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4: Relationship between secondary education and civic engagement, and violence (direct questions)
Dependent variable
Support political violence Used political violence Support political violence Used political violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Secondary education 0.021 0.045 −0.100∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.062) (0.044) (0.050)
Secondary education and civic engagement −0.202∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.136∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.056) (0.035) (0.034)
Constant 0.344∗∗∗ 0.090 0.257∗∗∗ 0.021 0.470∗∗∗ 0.213 0.190∗∗∗ 0.020
(0.034) (0.349) (0.029) (0.285) (0.041) (0.372) (0.027) (0.227)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 346 346 346 346 322 322 322 322
R2 0.0005 0.063 0.015 0.148 0.043 0.112 0.042 0.245
Adjusted R2 −0.002 0.015 0.012 0.104 0.040 0.065 0.039 0.206
Note: For each dependent variable, the table shows the simple difference in weighted means and includes the set of covariates (including
regional fixed effects) in the next column. Significance level indicated by ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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5 Discussion
Our results indicate that the sole provision of higher education may produce divergent re-
sults on violence, increasing support for violence but reducing the chances of actual participation.
However, when, in addition to higher education, young people are offered the opportunity to en-
gage civically, it can reduce their support for and involvement in violence, all else being equal.
While the latter result is consistent with our expectation, the former outcome that access to educa-
tion alone increases support for but reduces actual participation seems puzzling. In this section, we
employ both quantitative and qualitative data to shed light on the potential mechanisms that may
explain these findings. For our qualitative data, we draw on open-ended interviews with 25 key
informants, 15 of whom were youth, involved in carrying out the project to understand how they
perceived the project at its different phases of implementation.
5.1 Why higher education may increase support for and reduce participation in violence
In section 1, we argued that secondary education may reduce support for or participation
in violence through three possible channels: (1) via an improvement in perceptions of government
responsiveness; (2) via an increase in optimism about future employment prospects; and (3) via
a reduction in isolation and exclusion. Therefore, to understand the mechanism that explains our
results, we examined the relationship between secondary education and respondents’ attitudes to-
wards government service provision, their beliefs about job prospects, and feelings of isolation
and exclusion from society. We used a similar statistical method (i.e., matching on observable
characteristics) described in our analysis section to estimate these relationships.
Table 5 shows our results on the first two channels. On our first mechanism, our find-
ings suggest that while enrollment in higher education increases youth’s approval of government
services regarding the provision of water, electricity and health care, it decreases their positive
assessments of the government’s provision of education. Specifically, we find that compared to
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out-of -school youth, more than a third (33.7 percent) of those in the SYLI school program were
less likely to be satisfied with the government’s provision of education (columns (11) and (12)).
One reason why satisfaction with government provision of education is low may be due
to the poor quality of education. As one teacher from Burao put it, “Access to education is not
a problem but access to good quality education is the problem." A program like SYLI attempts
to address education quality by training teachers in Somaliland. However, according to our key
informants, low salaries for educators, the reluctance of teachers to being stationed in rural areas
and the phenomenon of “ghost” teachers (a situation where education officials take the salaries
of teachers who do not show up to teach) continue to impede the quality of education. Thus, it
is possible that continued dissatisfaction with the education system may fuel frustration towards
the government and contribute to support for violence among youth to pressure their leaders to
improve the quality of schooling.
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Table 5: Relationship between access to secondary education and favorability rating of government performance
Dependent variable
Favorable ratings of government performance
Water and electricity Security Unemployment Corruption Wages Education Healthcare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Secondary education 0.213∗ 0.295∗∗ −0.226∗∗ −0.191∗ 0.058 0.057 0.211 0.264 −0.266∗∗ −0.133 −0.334∗∗∗ −0.337∗∗∗ 0.152 0.405∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.136) (0.093) (0.105) (0.110) (0.130) (0.137) (0.162) (0.130) (0.147) (0.103) (0.120) (0.115) (0.125)
Constant 1.800∗∗∗ 1.575∗∗ 1.562∗∗∗ 2.266∗∗∗ 3.152∗∗∗ 2.745∗∗∗ 2.708∗∗∗ 4.005∗∗∗ 2.369∗∗∗ 4.734∗∗∗ 1.713∗∗∗ 3.101∗∗∗ 1.659∗∗∗ 2.037∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.709) (0.062) (0.549) (0.074) (0.677) (0.092) (0.842) (0.087) (0.768) (0.069) (0.623) (0.077) (0.653)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281
R2 0.011 0.258 0.021 0.240 0.001 0.169 0.008 0.179 0.015 0.242 0.037 0.218 0.006 0.291
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.204 0.017 0.185 −0.003 0.109 0.005 0.119 0.011 0.186 0.033 0.161 0.003 0.240
Note: For each dependent variable, the table shows the simple difference in weighted means and then includes covariates (including
regional fixed effects) in the next column. For each dependent variable, respondents rated the performance of government as very
bad, somewhat bad job, neither good nor bad, somewhat good job and very good. For each DV, we generated a dummy that takes
1 somewhat good job and very good, and 0 otherwise. Thus, we estimated the proportion of respondents who have a favorable
view of government performance. Significance level indicated by ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Regarding the second channel, Column (2) of Table 6 shows that youth who participated
in SYLI-supported schools were 13 percentage points less likely to feel optimistic about future
employment opportunities than out-of-school youth. Indeed, highly educated youth may be keenly
aware of the grim prospect of jobs in their society. Moreover, they are also more likely to be
mindful of the level of government’s effort to address such challenges, which may increase their
resentments. In qualitative interviews, many young people expressed fear and concern when de-
scribing the future. The leading cause of anxiety among youth was the possibility of not being able
to realize one’s goals because of limited opportunities to engage in economic and political life. In
particular, the youth expressed concern that they may not be able to find a job or livelihood, with
over 70 percent of those who were surveyed saying it was the biggest challenge in the country.
Given the high rates of unemployment in Somaliland (some estimate as high as 75 percent), youth
who are entering working age are faced with the reality that the odds of finding a job are not in
their favor. The significance of employment in Somaliland is not only the financial security that
comes with it but also the respect and status derived from being able to provide for oneself, one’s
family and one’s broader community. Indeed, the lack of livelihood militates against the youth’s
ability to make the critical transition to adulthood and to reach their aspirations.
Young people’s concerns about their inability to provide for themselves in the future can
turn into a grievance leading to support for political violence if youth believe that their government
is not doing enough to address their needs. In interviews with key informants, while many com-
mended what the elected Government of Somaliland has done regarding development, they also
expressed frustration at unmet expectations. Many youths said that the government responds as
much as it can to citizens’ needs, but limited foreign investment related to the territory’s contested
status constrains the government. However, not everyone believes that the lack of recognition is
the reason behind the slow development and limited opportunities. According to one young man,
“The decision-makers are more concerned about their interests than by public concerns. And I
don’t think things are going to change anytime soon. It’s about corruption." Whether substantiated
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Table 6: Relationship between access to secondary education and optimism about job prospects and feeling
of social exclusion
Dependent variable
Optimism about job prospects Feel isolated and excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Secondary education −0.110∗∗ −0.131∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗
(0.050) (0.056) (0.052) (0.063)
Constant 0.821∗∗∗ 0.099 0.335∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.290) (0.035) (0.328)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 281 281 281 281
R2 0.017 0.271 0.038 0.143
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.218 0.034 0.081
Note: For each dependent variable, the table shows the simple difference in weighted means and
then includes the set of covariates (including regional fixed effects) in the next column. Signifi-
cance level indicated by ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
by evidence of corruption, the more youth fail to see opportunities, particularly economic opportu-
nities, the more likely it is that frustration against the government will increase. The same applies
for support for armed opposition groups like Al Shabaab who offer youth economic and social
benefits for joining.
Finally, our analysis of the effect secondary education has on feelings of isolation and
exclusion indicates a positive relationship between higher education and the sense of marginaliza-
tion experienced by participating youth. Specifically, young people who attended SYLI–supported
schools are about 16 percentage points less likely to say that they feel isolated and excluded in
their communities compared to similar youth who are not in school (Table 6 column (4)). As noted
in the previous section, research shows that youth who are isolated and excluded tend to be pulled
more easily into violent groups that can provide a sense of community and belonging. Because
attending school reduces this perceived isolation and exclusion, youth may be less likely to be
allured by violent groups and engage in violence.
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Taken together, these results help to clarify why education can both increase support for
political violence and decrease participation in it. Essentially, in-school youth see a bleak future
and expect the government to do more to address educational and employment concerns. These
frustrations can help explain the increase in support for political violence, perhaps, to pressure the
government to address their concerns. The youth may also support or sympathize with others who
use force because they are either see no formal nonviolent channels to express their grievances or,
if they exist, they are unsure of how they operate or their efficacy. However, being in-school also
appears to discourage the youth from actually acting on these frustrations because they may feel
less isolated and are less vulnerable to recruitment.
5.2 Why education and civic engagement reduce propensity towards political violence
The civic engagement component of the SYLI program provides students with opportuni-
ties to engage positively, productively and peacefully in their communities. In turn, we argue that
it will increase participants’ sense of agency over their future and reduce their support of violence.
Both qualitative and quantitative data that we gathered provide support for our proposed mecha-
nism. In our interviews with key informants, a student leader in Hargeisa claimed that “[. . . ] civic
engagement is one of the most fulfilling and personally rewarding activities that I was involved in.
Our projects may be small, but they are meaningful. Now I see more than just my own self-interest
and I feel that I become [sic] whole-community member." Data from our survey buttress this point.
We find that youth who took part in the civic engagement projects were 15 percentage points more
likely than those in the control group to believe they have the power to make a positive difference
in their community (see olumn (2) of Table 7). Similarly, the combination of the two components
of the program induced a sense of civic duty, the perception that youth have a responsibility to
improve their community, by 17 percentage points (column (4) of Table 7).
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Table 7: Relationship between education and civic engagement activities and the sense of agency among
youth
Dependent variable
Can make positive difference Community improvement is my responsibility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Secondary education and civic engagement 0.171∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.035) (0.035) (0.039)
Constant 0.813∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.238) (0.030) (0.271)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 274 274 274 274
R2 0.098 0.235 0.078 0.164
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.181 0.074 0.105
Note: For each dependent variable, the table shows the simple difference in weighted means and
then includes the set of covariates (including regional fixed effects) in the next column. Signifi-
cance level indicated by ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Finally, another important mechanism through which civic engagement activities can help
reduce support for political violence is by building young people’s faith in the effectiveness of
nonviolent actions. Table 8 shows our results for the impact of education and civic engagement
activities on such indicators. The results show that youth who were also involved in student-
led community action projects were more likely than those who were not in school to believe
in the effectiveness of lodging a complaint with local officials, raising an issue in a group or
discussing concerns with community leaders in bringing about a desired change. For example,
youth in education and civic engagement treatments were 17 percentage points more likely to
believe that lodging a complaint with a local official was an effective way of bringing about a
desired change (column (2) of Table 8). The program not only increased the perceptions that these
nonviolent actions were effective but also the likelihood of youth actually using such channels.22
These findings indicate that participating in student-led community action projects can increase
22See results in Table B.2 in the Appendix.
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the belief that nonviolent alternatives to address concerns exist and are effective, reducing the
likelihood of youth supporting and using political violence.
Table 8: Relationship between secondary education and civic engagement and faith in the effectiveness of
nonviolent actions
Dependent variable
The following are effective ways to bring change:
Complaining to local officials Raising an issue in a group Discussion concerns with leaders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Secondary education and civic engagement 0.128∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.062) (0.067) (0.057) (0.067) (0.058)
Constant 0.272∗∗∗ −0.122 0.442∗∗∗ 0.771∗ 0.292∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.056) (0.426) (0.057) (0.395) (0.057) (0.396)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 274 274 274 274 274 274
R2 0.014 0.381 0.025 0.498 0.026 0.492
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.337 0.021 0.462 0.022 0.456
Note: For each dependent variable, the table shows the simple difference in weighted means and
then includes the set of covariates (including regional fixed effects) in the next column. Signifi-
cance level indicated by ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the joint effect of access to education and opportunities for civic
engagement on the support for and involvement in violence. While scholars agree that one of the
key motivations for participating in violence is grievance, they diverge on the source of such dis-
content. Some scholars emphasize the lack of opportunities for economic advancement as the chief
cause of grievance while others focus on alienation from political or decision-making processes.
Analysis of the impact of a rare education and civic engagement intervention in Somaliland allows
us to test whether: 1) access to education reduces support for or participation in violence; and 2)
access to education and opportunities for civic education jointly decrease support for or partici-
pation in violence. Our findings provide support for both channels of grievance and suggest that
focusing solely on economic grievance may be counterproductive in some settings.
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Specifically, we leveraged a youth-focused stability program on reducing youth engage-
ment in violence and improving stability through education and civic engagement implemented
by Mercy Corps’ under the auspices of the government of Somaliland. The program involved two
components. The first component involved the building of schools and training teachers to provide
access to education within communities. The second part began to roll out civic engagement op-
portunity programs in some of these schools. Drawing on unique data on attitudes of 806 youth
in and out of school in communities that benefited from these interventions, we test the effects of
improving access to education and civic engagement opportunities on young people’s propensity
towards political violence.
Our results indicate that when education is combined with student-led community action
projects (civic engagement), it can promote stability more than just the provision of education.
Schools play a critical role in creating an environment where youth are engaged in learning, and
feel less isolated and excluded. However, this by itself does not address young people’s frustra-
tion about being unable to realize their future aspirations and to make a positive difference in their
communities. We found that the addition of civic engagement activities to formal education op-
portunities alleviates some of this frustration by giving youth opportunities to engage positively
in their communities and increase confidence in their ability to achieve change through nonvio-
lent means. Hence, a combination of formal education and civic engagement activities that focus
on community action projects appears to be an effective pathway to support stability-related out-
comes. Importantly, these interventions were found to reduce young people’s vulnerability to being
drawn into violent groups, as well as to address their frustration about not being able to make a
difference in their communities and lives, which for some can be a motivator for supporting the
use of political violence. However, owing to data limitations, we note that these findings may be
applicable to urban areas only.
In addition, the non-random assignment of participants to treatment suggests that we cannot
entirely rule out potential confounding factors that may explain youths’ participation in education
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and civic engagement and political violence. However, we believe we have considered many of
the factors suggested by other scholars and that our study opens doors for future analysis.
Our study has policy implications from programs aimed at promoting stability and coun-
tering violence extremism in fragile and conflict-affected places. First, we have shown that the
addition of civic engagement activities can amplify the benefits of educational and other youth-
focused programs. Youth development programs can have greater impact on promoting stability
by building young people’s internal assets through formal and informal education and other skills-
building programs while also providing them with opportunities to use these skills to be active
and productive citizens. Essentially, to reduce violence, youth development programs must ad-
dress both the demand (lack of capacity, including knowledge and skills) and the supply (lack of
opportunities, including for civic engagement) sides of challenges that face youth.
Second, our findings imply that citizens’ perception about government performance in ser-
vice provision is important for the effectiveness of state’s policy initiative to build peace. One
reason why access to SYLI-supported schools increased support for political violence may be be-
cause government was not credited for the improvements made in the education sector, as expected.
In Somaliland and other comparable settings, visibility for the government in development projects
is a way to gain legitimacy, thereby deterring support for political violence. However, visibility
must always be linked to actual government investments and improvements in their capacities to
fulfill essential functions in a transparent and equitable way.
Finally, our research shows that young people desire to be positively engaged in social,
economic and political life. Expanding opportunities for young people to play a role in these
key sectors—along the lines of the SYLI program model—may be fundamental to strengthening
stability. Failing to do so, however, may lead this generation of youth to take desperate risks and
use violence to be recognized.
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A Online Appendix
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Male 802 0.596 0.491 0 1
Age 802 17.911 1.732 15 21
Poverty index 711 3.302 4.415 0 17
Marital status (Single) 801 0.958 0.202 0 1
Number of children 802 0.092 0.627 0 9
Community violence index 686 2.343 2.684 0 10
Victim of violence 754 0.302 0.460 0 1
Safety at night 790 0.610 0.488 0 1
Experienced displacement 802 0.125 0.331 0 1
Number of persons in household 778 9.464 4.032 0 30
Housing (permanent) 789 0.820 0.384 0 1
Interested in politics 778 0.517 0.500 0 1
Group member 802 0.161 0.368 0 1
Table A.1: Summary statistics of respondents’ characteristics
B Estimation approach
The s-IPTW is a propensity score approach to causal identification. Since we did not
control assignment of subjects to treatment, on average, individuals in the treatment group are
systematically different from those who did not receive the intervention (control group) on mea-
sured baseline characteristics. Our use of s-IPTW allows us to mimic a randomized control trial.
That is, it allows us to generate treated and control units that have similar treatment probabilities
conditional on a set of covariates.
To calculate the s-IPTW for each unit, we first used a logistic regression to estimate the
probability of being treated (i.e., propensity scores). Each subject’s score is based on the measured
baseline covariates that are understood to influence treatment. For each subject, the s-IPTW is
estimated as follows:
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s− IPTW =
P (Di)
P (Di|Xi)
=
DiP (Di = 1) + (1−Di)(1− P (Di = 1)
Dπi + (1−D)(1− πi)
where P (Di) represents the probability of an individual being treated. P (Di) is estimated as
the proportion of treated individuals in our sample assigned, and Di is the treatment status of
individual i. Xi is the set of covariates for individual i that we use to calculate the propensity
scores. πi represents the propensity scores for individual i estimated from the logistic regression.
Covariate balance using the s-IPTW is shown in Figures B.1 and B.2 below. We show balance
before and after the s-IPTW weighting in columns (1) and (2), respectively. Similarly, Table B.1
shows the balance before and after s-IPTW weighting. Once balance was achieved, to estimate the
weighted difference-in-means between treatment (in-school) and control (out-of-school) groups
for our outcome variables, we use a linear regression model as follows:
Yi = α + β1 ∗ Treatment+
∑
BjXj + ǫi
where Yi is the outcome of interest (DV) and β1 represents the treatment effect. We include Xj
the set of covariates used in the estimation of our propensity scores to improve the efficiency of
our estimates. In cases where we fail to achieve balance between treated and control units, the
inclusion of Xj allow us to hold constant the influence of these possible confounders. We also
include the regional fixed effects in our model to reduce omitted variable bias in our estimates. In
our estimation, each unit is weighted by its s-IPTW, which allows us to interpret β1 as the average
treatment effect of the intervention on the treated (ATT).
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Table B.1: Covariates balance statistics
Intervention
Secondary Education Secondary Education and Civic Engagement
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender (Male=1) −0.056 −0.005 −0.136∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗
(0.053) (0.061) (0.043) (0.062)
Age 0.043∗∗∗ −0.0004 0.078∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016)
Poverty index −0.028∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.026∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Marital status (Single) 0.179 0.120 0.122 0.052
(0.173) (0.191) (0.142) (0.231)
Number of children 0.098 0.046 0.055∗∗ 0.059
(0.137) (0.152) (0.028) (0.046)
Community violence index −0.022∗∗ −0.003 −0.014 0.014
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Victim of violence 0.074 0.022 0.090∗ −0.012
(0.057) (0.063) (0.053) (0.069)
Safety at night 0.205∗∗∗ 0.054 0.242∗∗∗ 0.105∗
(0.053) (0.060) (0.048) (0.062)
Experienced displacement 0.092 0.022 −0.004 0.052
(0.074) (0.088) (0.060) (0.089)
# persons in household 0.003 −0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Housing (permanent) 0.228∗∗∗ 0.066 0.370∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.072) (0.058) (0.088)
Interest in politics −0.031 −0.023 0.110∗∗ −0.025
(0.051) (0.059) (0.044) (0.060)
Group member 0.146∗∗ 0.049 0.135∗∗ 0.174∗∗
(0.068) (0.079) (0.058) (0.081)
Constant −0.658∗∗ 0.300 −1.304∗∗∗ 0.265
(0.304) (0.338) (0.268) (0.385)
Observations 346 346 322 322
R2 0.225 0.011 0.487 0.091
Adjusted R2 0.195 −0.028 0.465 0.053
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure B.1: Distribution of propensity scores for selecting into schools that offered only
Secondary Education
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Figure B.2: Distribution of propensity scores for selecting into schools that offered Secondary Education
and Civic Engagement
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Table B.2: Association between secondary education and civic engagement, and the use of nonviolent political protest
Dependent variable
Complained to local officals Joined others to raise an issue Discussed concerns with local leaders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Secondary education and civic engagement 0.076 0.047 0.385∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.050) (0.063) (0.059) (0.063) (0.052)
Constant 0.225∗∗∗ −0.874∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ −0.067 0.170∗∗∗ −0.890∗∗
(0.052) (0.345) (0.054) (0.405) (0.054) (0.358)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 274 274 274 274 274 274
R2 0.006 0.534 0.119 0.469 0.039 0.535
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.501 0.116 0.431 0.035 0.502
Note: Table B.2 reports the average treatment effect of school attendance and civic education on on the use of civic action. For
each dependent variable, respondents were first asked if they have engaged in such civic activity in the past and then whether
they thought such activity was effective. We report the treatment effect of the former in the odd numbered columns and the latter
(follow up) in even numbered columns. DVs:1) Complaint to local leaders: complaint made to local government officials; 2)
Joined others to raise an issue: joined others to raise an issue in school or community; and 3) Discussed concerns with local
leaders: discussed concerns with community leaders. Significance level indicated by ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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